Abraham Lincoln and the Border States (2024)

I

Lincoln'sborder state policy blended several objectives. The first was topreserve or establish loyal governments in each of these states. Insummarizing the administration's policy in Maryland in the earlyweeks of the war, General Nathaniel P. Banks, who was stationed inAnnapolis in 1861, declared, "The secession leaders—theenemies of the people—were replaced and loyal men assigned to... their duties. This made Maryland a loyal State."[9] In devising his border state policy, as would betrue later with his Reconstruction program, Lincoln always gavefirst priority to placing loyal men in control of the stategovernment.

Lincoln's second objective was that each ofthese Union state governments take the lead in fostering loyaltyamong its citizens, control the civilian population, and marshalthe resources of the state behind the war effort. Lincoln did notshirk from his responsibility—as he saw it—to suppressdisloyal activities among the civilian population, but he preferredto avoid such acts because they were controversial and politicallyembarrassing.[10] From his perspective, ifsuppression was necessary it was preferable for the stategovernments to take the lead in such activities.

Lincoln's third objective, closely relatedto the second, was to minimize the military occupation of thesestates so as to free troops for use at more critical points. Alarge occupying force diverted army units from the fighting and byincreasing friction between the army and the civilian populationinevitably produced resentment. This Page [End Page 16] was especially true in the western theater,where the fighting moved steadily away from Kentucky and Missouri.

Lincoln's final goal, which crystallizedonly after the first year of the war, was to end slavery in thesestates by voluntary state action. Anticipating a postwar Unionwithout slavery, he wanted the border states to take the lead byadopting some form of gradual emancipation funded by the federalgovernment. Foot dragging by the border states was an importantbackdrop to his decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation,but even after taking this momentous step, Lincoln continued toappeal to the border states (which were exempt from the terms ofthe Proclamation) to end slavery.

It is against these goals, and not just thequestion of secession, that Lincoln's border state policies need tobe evaluated. When these more ambitious policy objectives areconsidered, his record of leadership is less impressive. Withrespect to the border states, he was more successful in achievingsome goals than others, and his program was more successful in somestates than others. In broad terms, Lincoln's policies were fairlysuccessful in Maryland, produced a mixed record in Kentucky, andwere largely a failure in Missouri.

II

Following theoutbreak of war, public sentiment in Maryland loosely followed thestate's regional divisions. Western Maryland, an area of smallfarms with a diversified economy, was Unionist, while the majorslaveholding regions of the Eastern Shore and Southern Maryland,where the tobacco economy was concentrated, were pro-secession.Politically divided but with a vocal and militant secessionistminority, Baltimore, which contained a third of the state'spopulation, held the balance of power.[11]

Lincoln's policies in Maryland resembledthe proverbial iron fist in a velvet glove. The danger in the stateto the Union cause, and the threat to the national capital, wereimmediately apparent. On April 19, a pro-secessionist mob inBaltimore attacked the Massachusetts Sixth Regiment as it marchedacross the city to change trains on its way to Washington. In theensuing melee, several soldiers and a number of civilians werekilled. Worse still, the police commissioner ordered the railroadbridges outside the city destroyed and Page [End Page 17] the telegraph lines cut, and UnionistGovernor Thomas Hicks, who had earlier refused to call thelegislature into session, wavered and implored the Lincolnadministration not to send any more troops across the state.Hicks's request threatened to isolate Washington and leave thecapital unprotected.

Recognizing the delicate balance of opinionin the state, Lincoln resisted the impulse to force the right oftransit and agreed temporarily not to send any more troops throughBaltimore. Troops were still needed in Washington, however, andmilitary authorities quickly devised a less direct route by sea andrail through Annapolis.[12] John Hay, Lincoln's privatesecretary, recorded the president's belief that "if quiet was keptin Baltimore a little longer, Maryland might be considered thefirst of the redeemed."[13] Page [End Page 18]

Although Lincoln hoped to nurture pro-Unionsentiment in the state, he took no chances. He authorized themilitary to suspend the writ of habeas corpus along any militaryline in the state. It was thus in Maryland that Lincoln, feelinghis way in dealing with this unprecedented crisis, first suspendedthe writ and authorized arrests without trial.[14] Once Washington was secure, the army engaged in amassive display of force designed to overawe the civilianpopulation by occupying Federal Hill in Baltimore. Before long,although the state government continued to function, Maryland wasessentially under military occupation. Encouraged by this strongmilitary presence, public opinion, initially inchoate andundeveloped, quickly swung to the Union side.[15] Once the emotions that erupted following theattack on Fort Sumter subsided, there was no possibility thatMaryland would secede, but had it attempted to do so during theseearly weeks of the war, Lincoln unquestionably would have usedforce to keep the state in the Union.[16]

When the state legislature assembled inMay, it called for the recognition of the Confederacy but, underthe watchful surveillance of the military, it took no steps towarddisunion. In the special congressional election in June, Unionistcandidates polled 72 percent of the vote and triumphed in all sixraces. The fall election of 1861 was conducted in an atmosphere ofintimidation as federal troops arrested prominent secessionistmembers of the legislature, guarded the polls in a few areas onelection day, and seized disloyal citizens who tried to vote. Evenso, critics overstated the extent of military intervention. John A.Dix, the commanding general of the Middle District, refusedofficial requests to apply a loyalty oath and generally restrainedthe army's activities in order to avoid negative publicity.[17] Aided by Union soldiers who were given furloughsso they could vote, Unionist candidates were victorious, headed byAugustus W. Page [End Page 19]Bradford, who was elected governor by a better than two-to-onemargin. No doubt Bradford would have prevailed in any event, butfederal actions helped swell his margin of victory.[18] Bradford's election removed any doubt thatMaryland would remain in the Union. Throughout the war, the statewas heavily garrisoned because of the need to protect the capital,but it posed no military threat to the Union. When Lee invaded thestate in 1862, few Maryland residents welcomed him.

During the remainder of the war, relationsbetween the federal government and the state revolved around twoquestions: arbitrary arrests and federal interference with freeelections, and problems related to the institution of slavery. Inaddition, the Lincoln administration was drawn into the factionalstruggle for control of the burgeoning state Republican party.

Complaints of federal interference inelections in Maryland were endemic during the war. A good examplewas the dispute between Governor Bradford and commanding generalRobert C. Schenck over the latter's order imposing a test oath forvoting in the 1863 election. Federal officials were irritated atthe state's failure to enact an oath for voters, so Schenckannounced that the army would enforce one he promulgated at thepolls. Schenck, who had been elected to Congress from Ohio, claimedthat his purpose was to prevent disloyal elements from voting, buthe was equally interested in assisting the antislavery forces inthe state. Bradford immediately protested to Lincoln about militaryinterference with the election. After conferring with the general,the president modified Schenck's proclamation, designated GeneralOrders No. 53, concerning the arrest of disloyal individuals, butlet the oath stand. In his reply to the governor, Lincoln chidedthe state for failing to enact a loyalty oath and noted that underSchenck's order disloyal citizens could regain the right to vote bytaking the oath. "I think that is cheap enough," he observed.[19] Lincoln's handling of this problem evidencedgreat political skill. He managed simultaneously to offerconcessions to the governor, avoid undermining the militaryauthority in the state, and publicly affirm his policy that "allloyal qualified voters in Maryland Page [End Page 20] and elsewhere" should be allowed to votewithout disturbance.[20] What interference occurredon election day resulted more from the zealousness and politicalambitions of local officers than presidential policy.[21] Yet relations between the state and federalgovernment remained reasonably harmonious, and the issue ofarbitrary arrests and interference gradually subsided. Indeed, forthe 1864 election state officials stipulated a stricter loyaltytest than Schenck had imposed in 1863, and the election passed withlittle federal disturbance.

The dispute over Schenck's loyalty oath waspart of a larger struggle between radical Congressman Henry WinterDavis and Postmaster General Montgomery Blair, a conservative, forcontrol of the Unionist party in Maryland. Wishing to retain thesupport of both men, Lincoln tried as much as possible to keep outof this fight, Page [End Page 21]which he viewed as largely personal.[22] Again, hesteered a middle course, taking a more radical stand onemancipation than Blair, whom he removed from the Cabinet in 1864,yet unwilling to go as far as Davis and the radicals on this andrelated questions. While unable to stop the bitter factionalstruggle within the emerging Republican party in Maryland,Lincoln's temperate actions also bore fruit. Unionist sentimentremained paramount in the state, and in 1864 Lincoln and theRepublican party gained a clear victory. The Republicans woncontrol of the statehouse and the legislature and elected amajority of the state's congressmen. Most striking was Lincoln'svictory. In 1860, he had received only 2,294 votes in the state; in1864, he polled more than 40,000 votes and secured 55.1 percent ofthe popular vote (Table 2). Lincoln's personal triumph was testimony tohis adroit management of affairs in Maryland.

III

When the warbegan Kentucky, like Maryland, found itself torn between itsloyalty to the Union and its cultural ties to the South.[23] Secession sentiment was stronger in Kentucky,however, and it was not possible to occupy the state militarily aswas done in Maryland. Complicating the situation was the fact thatthe governor, Beriah Magoffin, favored secession. When Lincolncalled for troops after the firing on Fort Sumter, Magoffinindignantly refused to supply any, and the state house ofrepresentatives officially adopted a policy of "strict neutrality."Union leaders such as John J. Crittenden endorsed the policy ofneutrality as a temporary holding action; Kentucky's neutralityquickly became part of a game of maneuver between Unionists andpro-Confederates in the state for political supremacy.[24] Page [End Page 22]

Confronted with Kentucky's neutral stanceand pleas for restraint from Unionist leaders, Lincoln movedcautiously so as not to provoke public opinion in the state whilewaiting for the population's latent Unionism to assert itself.Varying his policy according to the situation, he realized that hecould not force the issue the way he had in Maryland. A lessrestrained approach in the early months of the war might well havedriven the state into the Confederacy.

In this difficult period, Lincoln avoidedissuing any threats and used conciliatory language. He resisted thedemands of Republican governors and editors to adopt a vigorouscoercive policy against the state, and also the pleas of militarycommanders to seize the initiative and invade Kentucky.[25] Recognizing that the state's neutrality could notlast long, Lincoln initially did not challenge it. He forbad thearmy to recruit volunteers in the state, declined to prohibit tradewith the Confederacy, and promised Garrett Davis, a prominentUnionist, that he would not use force against the state if it didnot resist the laws and authority of the United States. He repeatedthis pledge in another meeting with state leaders in July but wascareful not to commit himself as to future action.[26] At the same time, he commenced shipping arms toKentucky Unionists, and by early summer he authorized recruitingUnion troops in the state. Time would demonstrate the wisdom ofwhat James Russell Lowell, who demanded a militant approach,sarcastically termed Lincoln's "Little Bo Peep policy."[27]

While antislavery spokesmen such as Lowellfumed, Lincoln's pragmatic policy bore immediate dividends. In aspecial congressional election in June, Union candidates won nineof ten seats. Among those elected was Crittenden, the symbol ofborder state Page [End Page 23]Unionism. Throughout the summer, both sides stepped up recruitingefforts in the state, but Lincoln continued to ignore Confederateactivities in the state. In another special election in August toelect a new legislature, Unionists scored a resounding triumph,winning seventy-six of a hundred seats in the house and withholdovers twenty-seven of thirty-eight in the senate.[28] With Unionists in firm control of the legislatureand the congressional delegation, it was only a matter of timeuntil Kentucky's policy of neutrality was discarded.

A crisis suddenly developed, however, whenJohn C. Frémont, the military commander in Missouri, issued onhis own authority a proclamation freeing the slaves of all disloyalpersons in Missouri. Kentucky Unionists immediately warned Lincolnof the potentially disastrous impact of Frémont's proclamationon public opinion in the state. Lincoln had already taken steps torevoke parts of Frémont's proclamation, but he subsequentlyemphasized its consequences for the struggle over Kentucky. "TheKentucky Legislature would not budge till that proclamation wasmodified," he explained, "and Gen. [Robert] Anderson telegraphed methat on the news of Gen. Fremont having actually issued deeds ofmanumission, a whole company of our Volunteers threw down theirarms and disbanded. I was so assured, as to think it probable, thatthe arms we had furnished Kentucky would be turned against us."[29]

The decisive event that drove Kentucky outof its neutrality was not Frémont's rash act but theConfederate army's invasion of the state in September 1861. Inquick order, U.S. forces under Ulysses S. Grant occupied Paducah,Kentucky, the legislature demanded the withdrawal of theConfederate forces, and when the Confederacy refused, it requestedfederal aid to expel them. Lincoln promptly responded by sendingadditional troops to occupy the state, and Confederate forces weresoon driven from Kentucky. Despite the establishment of a shadowyConfederate government and General Braxton Bragg's subsequentinvasion in 1862, Union control of the state was never undermined.In his first annual message, Lincoln observed: "Kentucky ... forsome time in doubt, is now decidedly, and, I think, unchangeably,ranged on the side of the Union."[30] His Page [End Page 24] tactfulhandling of the state in these early months of the war contrastedsharply with Confederate leaders' imperious approach. As E. MertonCoulter concluded, "The South, too impatient to be tolerant and tooimpetuous to be tactful, lost the greatest prize of theWest—Kentucky."[31]

This result left Governor Magoffin in adifficult position. Unionists distrusted him, and hence thelegislature systematically hamstrung him and, as much as possible,simply ignored him. Eventually in 1862 he resigned after thelegislature designated an acceptable successor. In 1863, ThomasBramlette, the Unionist candidate, was elected governor by acommanding majority.

The outcome of the political struggle inKentucky in 1861, however, did not end Lincoln's problems with thestate. One point of irritation was trade. To prevent shipment ofcontraband to the Confederacy, the Treasury Department requiredpermits for most goods and passengers. Applicants had to take anoath of allegiance and meet a stringent test of past loyalty.Complaints mounted that the permit system was used to punish anyonesuspected of disloyalty or who ran athwart military officers. Theseprotests reached a peak during the tenure of General E. A. Paine,who was finally removed for abusing his powers.[32]

More serious was the growing resentmentover arbitrary arrests and military interference in elections.Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus gave widediscretionary powers to military commanders, and he found itdifficult to regulate their activities, especially on a day-to-daybasis. The various raids of John Hunt Morgan, the flight of manyguerrillas from Missouri to the state, and the continuingactivities of bands of Home Guards, initially created to preventsecession in 1861, all contributed to the increase in violence andirregular fighting in 1864. In July 1864 Lincoln imposed martiallaw on the state, and it remained under this edict for the durationof the war.[33] The state suffered moredisorder than Maryland, especially in 1864, and thus militaryintervention and suppression were more frequent.

The effect of these actions was to alienateKentucky's Unionists from the administration. Governor Bramlettewas particularly outspoken in his criticism. The army's intrusionwas especially marked Page [End Page 25] in the 1863 election, and matters worsened againin the 1864 presidential campaign when several prominent Unionists,including the lieutenant governor, were arrested by militaryauthorities. The situation required tact and forbearance, but thecommanding general, Stephen G. Burbridge, who appealed to the smallradical element in the state, was devoid of both. Early in 1865Lincoln finally removed Burbridge and replaced him with GeneralJohn A. Palmer, a much more capable administrator, but only the endof the war eliminated the problems that had produced such friction.As one Lincoln paper in the state commented, the president eitherhad to change commanders "or give the whole of his time to themanagement of Kentucky affairs."[34]

It was Lincoln's policy on emancipation andblack troops, however, more than arbitrary arrests or militaryinterference with elections, that accounted for his unpopularity inthe state. The army's refusal to return runaway slaves producedinevitable friction with Kentucky slaveowners, and Lincolnjustified his initial reluctance to accept black soldiers on thegrounds that it would turn Kentucky and the border states againstthe Union.[35] When he reversed thispolicy in 1863, it produced such an angry protest in Kentucky thatLincoln agreed not to enlist blacks in the state if it met itsdraft quotas through volunteering. In early 1864, with enlistmentslagging, army officials in Kentucky began enrolling free blacks andslaves, and military authorities arrested several prominent stateleaders for resisting recruitment of black soldiers. Blackenlistments further alienated public opinion from theadministration.[36]

Lincoln's policies were only partlysuccessful in Kentucky. More Kentuckians fought for the Union thanthe Confederacy, and when the rebel army invaded the state onseveral different occasions, it did not receive a friendlyreception. In other respects, however, Lincoln's policies failed.Although Kentucky remained loyal to the Union, its congressionaldelegation strongly opposed the president. Lincoln never enjoyedmuch popularity in the state, especially after he adoptedemancipation as a war aim, and Kentucky voted for George McClellanin 1864 by a decisive margin; indeed, Lincoln's Page [End Page 26] proportion ofthe popular vote (30.2 percent) was the lowest he received in anyof the 25 states that participated in the 1864 election (Table 2). TheRepublican party remained weak in the state, primarily becauselarge numbers of Unionists supported the Democratic party over theslavery issue. Emancipation, black troops, military arrests, andsuppression had all combined to unite Unionists and conservativesin the Democratic organization. Governor Bramlette, who supportedLincoln longer than most Kentuckians before breaking with him in1864, warned the president that the extreme measures of hismilitary commanders "have aroused the determined opposition to yourreelection of at least three fourths of the people of Kentucky."[37] The Republican party was confined to the mostuncompromising Unionists and the most radical antislavery elementsin the state.

IV

It was inMissouri, however, that Lincoln's policies achieved the leastsuccess.[38] More than any other borderstate, Missouri suffered from internal warfare, bitter politicalfactionalism, and chaos and disorder during the war. Thedisappearance of many of the arrest records for Missouri precludesa precise tabulation, but it is clear that a staggering number ofcivilians were arrested for disloyal activity, and that the numberof arbitrary arrests far exceeded that in any other loyal state.[39]

As in Kentucky, the onset of war inMissouri found a secessionist, Claiborne F. Jackson, in thegovernor's chair and a legislature that was more secessionist thanthe population as a whole. Jackson refused Lincoln's call fortroops in April, but the secessionists were not strong enough tostampede the state out of the Union.[40] William S.Harney, commander of the U.S. forces in the state, reported thatUnionists outnumbered secessionists in the interior of the statetwo to one and were a majority in St. Louis, gaining strengthdaily.[41] Page [End Page 27] What was required to hold the state was apolicy of tact and patience similar to that Lincoln followed inKentucky.

The arrival of Captain Nathaniel Lyon, astern antislavery New Englander, with a small contingent of U.S.troops from Kansas seriously weakened the prospects for a peacefulresolution. Even prior to his transfer, Lyon, who had aided theantislavery forces during the turmoil in Kansas, had concluded that"it is no longer useful to appeal to reason but to the sword, andtrifle no longer in senseless wrangling."[42] Placed in the sensitive position of defending theSt. Louis arsenal, the impatient Lyon began recruiting largenumbers of volunteers while keeping a close watch on thesecessionists. He soon formed a close alliance with formerCongressman Frank Blair, the brother of Postmaster GeneralMontgomery Blair and head of the Republican party in Missouri. OnApril 21 Lincoln, influenced by Frank Blair, recalled GeneralWilliam S. Harney, commander of the Department of the West, forconsultations and put Lyon temporarily in charge of the troops inSt. Louis.

The rash and impulsive Lyon lost littletime in upsetting the delicate balance and throwing the situationinto chaos by surrounding Camp Jackson, which posed no militarythreat, and capturing the state militia encamped there. Lyon'saction was a major blunder: it achieved no crucial military end,provoked a serious riot in St. Louis by Confederate sympathizers,and, worst of all, drove many conditional Unionists over to theConfederacy. Quickly returning from Washington, Harney, whobelieved that precipitate application of force would make mattersworse, worked to defuse the situation and allow Union sentiment todevelop. To this end, he negotiated an understanding with SterlingPrice, commander of the state militia, to maintain the peace.Harney bluntly informed the government that aggressive militaryforce "could not secure the results the Government seeks, viz: TheMaintenance of the loyalty now fully aroused in the State, and herfirm security in the Union."[43]

Unconditional Unionists were dismayed atthe Harney-Price agreement, while conservatives endorsed Harney'saction. In the Cabinet, Bates defended Harney and condemned Lyon,while Montgomery Blair took the side of Lyon and his brother. Inthe end, under heavy pressure from the Blairs, Lincoln once againremoved Harney.[44] Page [End Page 28]

Placed in command of the department, Lyon,who was devoid of common sense, promptly stirred up additionaltrouble. In a contentious four-hour meeting with the governor, hemade clear his intention to use force against those he deemeddisloyal. Jackson hastened back to the capital and issued aproclamation of war against the United States. Two days later, Lyonmarched on the capital and put Jackson and other secessionist stateofficials to flight; skirmishing soon broke out between Lyon'sforces and secessionists, who eventually organized a phantomConfederate state government with Jackson as governor. In less thantwo months, the reckless Lyon had plunged the state into a civilwar that would never be completely suppressed during the next fouryears.

With the regular state government deposed,the state convention, which had been originally elected to considersecession, reconvened shorn of its secessionist members. Itproceeded to declare the state offices vacant, dissolve thelegislature, and establish a provisional state government withHamilton R. Gamble, a conservative Whig, as governor. Gamble wasthe brother-in-law of Edward Bates, Lincoln's attorney general. Theprovisional government was to serve only until November, when newelections would be held, but the election was postponed severaltimes and the provisional government remained in power untilJanuary 1865, when it was replaced by regularly elected officers.

Lincoln meanwhile had appointed John C.Frémont, the famous western explorer and the Republicanparty's first presidential candidate, commander of the westerndepartment. Frémont proved woefully incompetent as anadministrator, military leader, and politician. He arrived thedarling of the Blair clan, but their ardor began to cool when hefailed to reinforce Lyon, who lost his life at the Battle ofWilson's Creek. At the same time, friction steadily mounted betweenGamble and the aloof and imperious Frémont, who considered thegovernor a nuisance and refused to consult him.

Harried by guerrillas operating behind hislines and unable to drive Confederate forces out of the state,Frémont in desperation issued a proclamation on August 30establishing martial law throughout the state and freeing theslaves of all disloyal masters in Missouri. Aware of thepotentially disastrous impact this step would have on opinion inthe border states, and unwilling to abdicate Page [End Page 29] his responsibility ascommander-in-chief to determine policy, Lincoln instructedFrémont to retract his proclamation. When the dim-witted butstubborn general refused, Lincoln publicly revoked it.[45] Frémont's fate was sealed: he had managed toalienate all but the most radical antislavery people in the state,and with virtually all factions clamoring for his head, Lincolnremoved him a hundred days after he had assumed command.

The Confederate military threat to Missourifinally ended with the Union victory at the Battle of Pea Ridge inMarch 1862. Yet the removal of this threat did not bring peace andorder to the state. Instead, Missouri remained under martial law,the legacy of Lyon's and Frémont's tenure, and guerrillawarfare raged across the state as partisans sought to even oldscores or avenge new ones. Federal officials, reluctant to divertregular troops from the fighting, wanted the state government tohandle the problem. The provisional government created a specialforce, the Enrolled Missouri Militia, to maintain order and putdown the guerrillas, but it proved ineffective. Eventually inexasperation the army adopted the draconian solution of evacuatingcivilians from four western counties, a process that producedtwenty thousand refugees. No policy pursued by the federalgovernment, however, was able to end the fighting or eliminate theirregular bands of Confederate partisans.[46]

Following Frémont's removal relationsbetween the military and Gamble and the provisional governmenttemporarily improved, only to soon deteriorate again. Disputesarose over control of the state militia and its relationship tofederal troops in the state. As in the other border states, therewas constant trouble over the army and slavery.[47] Solution of these problems at the local level,intensified as they were by personal hatreds and rival ambitions,was impossible. Lincoln's secretaries noted with regard to thestate that "as a rule, serious local quarrels in any part of thecountry, whether of personal politics or civil or militaryadministration, very soon made their way Page [End Page 30] to President Lincoln for settlement."Yet sorting through the "tangle of conflicting sentiment andirreconcilable factions" in the state from Washington was well nighimpossible.[48] Missouri affairs became aperpetual headache for the president.

Both Gamble and his opponents looked to thefederal military commander for support and assistance in theirstruggle for state power. In a position that required tact,tolerance, and a delicate balancing of political interests,Lincoln's commanders were unequal to the task. Frémont failedmiserably, and the new commander, Samuel R. Curtis, a former Iowacongressman, sided with the radical antislavery forces in the stateagainst Gamble. Lincoln's tireless efforts to heal the breach andget the two men to work together were unsuccessful, so he finallyremoved Curtis in order to break up the quarrel. The new commander,John Schofield, threw the power of his command behind Gamble andthe conservatives, which produced a Radical outcry against him andeventually led to his replacement by William S. Rosecrans. Lincolnthrew up his hands in frustration at the failure of his commandersto stay out of the state's politics.[49]

The Republican party in Missouri was rentby bitter factionalism as Radicals demanding the end of slaverybattled against conservatives who gave priority to the Union issue.Charges and countercharges were hurled back and forth, and onedelegation after another regularly trooped to the capital to winsupport in its battle for state supremacy. Caught between theserival groups, Lincoln and his military commander inevitably wereunable to satisfy either side and became a target for both. Intemper and spirit he was closer to Gamble and the conservatives,while on questions of policy, especially emancipation, he wascloser to the Radicals. Lincoln's unwillingness to take sides inthe state's factional disputes led Gamble, in an outburst to Bates,to dismiss the president as "a mere intriguing, pettifogging,piddling politician."[50] Page [End Page 31]

Gamble's death in 1864 left theconservatives disorganized and without a leader and enabled theRadicals to assume dominance. At the 1864 Republican convention,Missouri was the only state to oppose Lincoln's renomination, andeven though the state supported him in the election that fall (Table 2) andadopted emancipation in 1865, affairs in the state remained apersistent and insoluble problem for the president. The viciousirregular fighting in the state, the endemic politicalfactionalism, and the large number of arbitrary arrests were alltestimony to the failure of Lincoln's policies in Missouri.

V

The mostsensitive problem Lincoln confronted in dealing with the borderstates was slavery. As has already been noted, he revokedFrémont's emancipation edict in 1861 with an eye to publicopinion in the border states. In 1862, he negated another orderfreeing the slaves by one of his generals, David Hunter, in SouthCarolina. During this period, as the president carefully consideredthe problem Page [End Page 32] ofslavery and the Union war effort, he prodded the border states toabolish the institution by state action.

The first step he took in this directionwas his message to Congress in December 1861, in which herecommended compensated emancipation in the border states.[51] He drafted a bill providing for compensatedemancipation in Delaware, which had fewer than two thousand slaves,to serve as a pilot project for ending slavery in all the otherborder states. Lincoln's proposed bill was very conservative: itprovided federal compensation to slave owners, authorized anapprenticeship system for minors, and ended slavery gradually overa thirty-year period. Nevertheless, hostility in the Delawarelegislature was so strong the bill's supporters declined to evenintroduce it.[52] Delaware's response did notauger well for Lincoln's hopes that the border states would adoptemancipation.

When Congress took no notice of theproposal in his annual message, the president sent a specialmessage on March 6, 1862 proposing federal funding for a program ofcompensated emancipation in the loyal slave states. He calculatedthat at the rate of $400 per slave, the expense to free all theslaves in the border states was less than the cost of the war foreighty-seven days.[53]

Four days later, he summoned therepresentatives of the border states in Congress to the WhiteHouse, where he urged them to adopt a program of gradualcompensated emancipation, noting that the controversies among theUnion's supporters over slavery and its associated problems were"numerous, loud and deep." He repeated his argument that such aprogram would shorten the war.[54] The border stateleaders present were generally skeptical, and when Congresssubsequently approved a joint resolution agreeing to fund such aprogram, they remained opposed.[55]

Undaunted, Lincoln held a second meetingwith border state leaders on July 12, 1862. Earlier, in annullingHunter's proclamation, he Page [End Page 33] had told the border state men, "You cannot ... beblind to the signs of the times." Returning to this theme, he wasearnest and forthright. He emphasized the great dissatisfaction hisaction had produced. "The incidents of the war cannot be avoided,"he warned. "If the war continue long, as it must, if the object benot sooner attained, the institution in your states will beextinguished by mere friction and abrasion—by the mereincidents of war. It will be gone, and you will have nothingvaluable in lieu of it."[56]

Despite Lincoln's plea, the border stateleaders remained obdurate. A minority announced that they wouldurge the people of their states to consider Lincoln's plan, but themajority, including Crittenden and Garrett Davis of Kentucky,signed a report reiterating all their previous objections toemancipation. These objections were summarized by a MarylandUnionist who characterized emancipation as the beginning "of agreat social revolution of labor and representation, in the midstof a political revolution."[57]

In the wake of the border state leaders'rejection of his second appeal, Lincoln decided to issue theEmancipation Proclamation. Yet even after he released thepreliminary proclamation in September 1862, he continued to clingto the hope that the border states would adopt his program ofgradual compensated emancipation. "Mr. Lincoln's whole soul isabsorbed in his plan of remunerative emancipation," his oldassociate David Davis of Illinois reported after visitingWashington in November. "He believes that if Congress will pass alaw authorizing the issuance of bonds for the payment ofemancipated negroes in the border States that Delaware, Maryland,Kentucky, and Mo. will accept the terms."[58] He again recommended his plan in his annualmessage in December 1862. By this time, however, the initiative hadto come from the border states themselves.

Public opinion in Maryland was generallyhostile to the Emancipation Proclamation. Governor Bradford refusedto sign an address of the Union governors approving Lincoln'saction, and Congressman John W. Crisfield, one of the largestslaveholders in the state, publicly broke with the president overthis question. The state's congressional delegation opposed the1862 bill abolishing slavery in Page [End Page 34] the District of Columbia, which the state hadoriginally ceded to the federal government, and the Maryland Houseof Delegates denounced the law as a threat to the state and aviolation of its rights.[59] Even so, opinion in thestate slowly began to shift in response to the war's developments.The state's Union coalition, which united former Whigs, KnowNothings, and War Democrats, increasingly divided on the issue, andin 1863 the party split in two over the questions of emancipationand a new state constitution.

The 1863 election was a test of strengthbetween the radical wing of the party, who called themselves theUnconditional Unionists, and their opponents. Led by Henry WinterDavis, the Unconditional Unionists favored immediate anduncompensated emancipation, black enlistments in the Union army,and a strict loyalty test in order to weaken the Democratic party.The conservatives and moderates, led by Montgomery Blair, favoredemancipation along the lines Lincoln had proposed, opposed blacksoldiers, and sought to win Democratic support. Capitalizing onpopular frustration with the war and discontent over the policieson which it was being waged, the Unconditionals won a decisivevictory in the fall election, carrying the one statewide officewith 69 percent of the vote, winning four of the state's fivecongressional seats, and gaining control of the legislature.

Following the election, Lincoln counseledharmony in the Union ranks. Asserting that "I am very anxious foremancipation to be effected in Maryland in some substantial form,"he indicated that while he preferred a gradual program, believingit would produce less confusion and destitution, he was not opposedto immediate emancipation. "My wish is that all who are foremancipation in any form, shall cooperate, all treating allrespectfully, and all adopting and acting upon the major opinion,when fairly ascertained. What I have dreaded," he continued, "isthe danger that by jealousies, rivalries, and consequent ill-blood... the friends of emancipation themselves may divide, and lose themeasure altogether."[60] Divisions in the Unionistconstituency, which extended beyond ideology to personal rivalries,were too deep to be healed by appeals to goodwill and commonpurpose.

Capitalizing on their new power, theRadicals now moved to end Page [End Page 35] slavery in the state. The voters approved holdinga constitutional convention, and a majority of the delegateselected were emancipationists. The proposed new constitutionabolished slavery in the state, subject to popular ratification. Inan important move, the convention authorized soldiers in the fieldto vote on the proposed constitution. Referring to the upcomingvote on the antislavery constitution, Secretary of War EdwinStanton told Lew Wallace, the new commanding general in the state,that "the President has set his heart on the abolition by that way;and mark, he don't want it to be said by anybody that the bayonethad anything to do with the election."[61] Whenantislavery forces requested his aid, Lincoln threw his influencebehind the drive to ratify the constitution. In a public letter toa meeting in Baltimore, he endorsed the extinction of slavery inthe state: "I wish success to this provision. I desire it on everyconsideration. I wish all men to be free."[62] In a close vote, the new constitution wasapproved, with the soldier vote providing the margin of victory forit and emancipation.[63] Although disappointed thatthe state had not taken this step two years earlier when he hadurged it to do so, Lincoln was nevertheless pleased. In his finalannual message, he hailed the "complete success" of emancipation inthe state. "Maryland," he declared, "is secure to Liberty and Unionfor all the future."[64]

The emancipation forces prevailed inMissouri as well. Much as in Maryland, the conservative Unionistsdragged their feet and failed to keep up with the advance of publicopinion. The emancipationists won control of the legislature in the1862 elections and steadily gained strength in 1863 and 1864.Emancipation became the most important issue in the state'spolitics. The Radicals, known as the Charcoals, many of whom hadbeen Republicans before the war, called for immediate emancipation.The reactionaries, or Snowflakes, opposed any interference with theinstitution, while the conservatives and moderates, led by Gambleand referred to as the Claybanks (because their stance wasallegedly colorless), called for gradual emancipation. Still inpower, the popular convention in 1863 approved a plan to endslavery in 1870 with terms of apprenticeship Page [End Page 36] after that date. Lincoln criticizedthis plan, not because emancipation was gradual, but because itpostponed the start for seven years. He told Schofield that hepreferred a short period of emancipation and safeguards againstslaves being sold in the meantime. "I have very earnestly urged theslave-states to adopt emancipation; and it ought to be, and is anobject with me not to overthrow, or thwart what any of them may ingood faith do, to that end."[65]

Dissatisfied with this program, theRadicals kept up the agitation on emancipation, and in 1864succeeded in getting a convention called to draft a new stateconstitution. In the fall election, the Radicals won a majority ofthe delegates. The convention assembled in January 1865 and drafteda constitution that decreed immediate and unconditionalemancipation. In the subsequent vote on ratification, soldierballots again tipped the scales in favor of the new constitutionand emancipation.[66]

With more slaves than any other borderstate, Kentucky stubbornly clung to the dying institution to thebitter end. Precisely because slavery was stronger in Kentucky,Lincoln was convinced that if the state had responded favorably in1862 to his original emancipation scheme, the war would have beenbrought to a close earlier. Instead, the state's congressionaldelegation opposed the president's plan for federally fundedgradual emancipation, the legislature passed resolutions condemningthe Emancipation Proclamation, and political leaders in the statedenounced any move toward emancipation. Amendment of the Kentuckyconstitution was a particularly cumbersome process, but the state'sfailure to act was ideological rather than institutional. KentuckyUnionists remained bitter at what they perceived as Lincoln'sbetrayal of the original purpose of the war, and a majority refusedto make any concessions or adjust to the changing world about them.After the Emancipation Proclamation was issued, a newspaperreporter declared that opinion was "universal" in the state thatthe president "has proved false to his platform, his pledges, andto his once ardent supporters and coadjutors in the Border SlaveStates."[67] The situation did notimprove over time. Indeed, defiant to the end, the legislaturerefused to ratify Page [End Page 37] the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865. Lincoln'sgreatest disappointment concerning his policies in Kentucky was hisinability to get his native state to budge on the question ofslavery.

VI

How, then, dowe account for the varying success of Lincoln's policies in thesethree states? Why was he reasonably successful in Maryland andKentucky but not Missouri? The problem is more perplexing becauseenlistment records suggest that Unionism was stronger in Missourithan either of the other states (Table 3). Certainly there seems tohave been less chance of the state seceding in 1861 than eitherMaryland or Kentucky.

In explaining Lincoln's difficulties inMissouri, James G. Randall provided a pat answer: the existence inthe state of a powerful group of Radicals was the source of all ofLincoln's problems.[68] The Radicals wereconsiderably stronger in Missouri than in Maryland, and they barelyexisted in Kentucky. But the division between Lincoln and theRadicals was not as sharp as Randall contended. Indeed, Lincolnrecognized that on questions of policy, he was closer to them thanto their opponents. Shortly after meeting with a group of MissouriRadicals, Lincoln remarked to his secretary, John Hay, "They arenearer to me than the other side, in thought and sentiment, thoughbitterly hostile to me personally. They are utterlylawless—the un-handiest devils in the world to dealwith—but after all their faces are set Zionwards."[69] As Lincoln's comment suggests, more fundamentalfactors shaped the outcome of Lincoln's policies.

Perhaps the most obvious point to make, andthe place to begin in analyzing this problem, is the importance ofproximity. Maryland was closest to Washington, whereas Missouri wasfarthest away and Kentucky lay in between. Transportation andcommunication facilities were significantly better in the war thanthey were in, say, Andrew Jackson's time, yet the fact remainedthat the federal government in general best managed problems thatwere close at hand. Easy consultation with state political leaders,a surer grasp of public opinion, and a clearer sense of theproblems were all consequences Page [End Page 38] of shorter distances. Baltimore was "only apleasant morning jaunt by rail from ... Washington," Robert C.Schenck explained concerning his experiences as commander inMaryland, and thus no sooner did military officials take an actionthan "a delegation of influential Unionists at once hurried to thePresident... "[70] The consequence was to keepLincoln better informed about matters in the state and also to putthe military under tighter executive control. No such closescrutiny was possible in Kentucky or Missouri, and as a resultWashington displayed what Allan Nevins termed "a censurable myopiaconcerning the West."[71]

Lincoln's frustration with the situation inMissouri in 1861 is a case in point. He sent Postmaster GeneralMontgomery Blair to St. Louis to advise Frémont. Frémontsoon broke politically with the Blairs, and a crescendo ofaccusations between Frank Blair and Frémont descended upon thepresident. Uncertain of the true situation, Lincoln dispatchedSecretary of War Simon Cameron and Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomason a fact-finding trip. Rather than reserving the final decision tohimself, as became his practice once he grew into his job, Lincolnauthorized Cameron to remove Frémont if he thought itnecessary.[73] This delegation ofpresidential responsibility betrayed his fundamental uncertaintyabout affairs in the state.

Exacerbating the situation in Missouri werethe blunders of Union leaders in the initial weeks of the conflict.In this period, Lincoln relied primarily on Frank Blair, theleading Republican in the state, Page [End Page 39] for advice. The hard-drinking Blair was nota good choice. Ambitious, outspoken, and passionate, he was oftenreckless and impulsive and offered highly colored advice. Hay, whowas initially impressed with the Blairs, ultimately concluded thatthey "were not the safest guides about Missouri matters." Hecomplained that despite his and other individual's warnings,Lincoln continued to get "the greater part of his information fromthe Blairs & the Bates people who do not seem to me entirelyimpartial." While appreciative of the Blairs' early support for thepresident, Hay nonetheless believed that Lincoln placed too muchreliance on them.[74]

Denouncing General William S. Harney'spolicy of moderation, Blair kept up a constant pressure to have theveteran soldier removed from command. Uncertain what to do, Lincolninitially wavered and then made a serious error in judgment bydelegating the decision Page [End Page 40] to Blair.[75] Armed with thispresidential authorization to remove the general if in his opinionit was urgently necessary, Blair removed Harney from command andjoined forces with Captain (soon Brigadier General) Nathaniel Lyon,with the disastrous consequences already noted. By the time Lyonwas killed, serious damage had already been done to the Unioncause. Frémont's utter incompetence merely magnified theseproblems. Lincoln's secretaries, John Nicolay and John Hay, whodefended his vacillating policy, recognized the long-termconsequences of this rupture in the Unionist ranks in Missouri."The local embitterment in St. Louis beginning then ran on forseveral years," they noted, "and in its varying and shifting phasesgave the President no end of trouble in his endeavor from first tolast to be just to each faction."[76]

Lincoln's inexperience and lack ofknowledge was especially apparent in his handling of the Missourisituation in these early months. He made notoriously poorappointments and, lacking any real Page [End Page 41] knowledge of the state or its politics, herelied on unsuitable advisers. Moreover, because Missouri wasdistant from Washington and removed from the major militarytheaters, Lincoln devoted less attention to the state. Withoutguidance from Washington about how to deal with a disloyal civilianpopulation, Frémont acted on his own, instituting martial lawand freeing the slaves of rebel masters. Historians havetraditionally cited Lincoln's revocation of Frémont's edict asan example of his leadership concerning the border states, but itwas probably the most unpopular act he committed during the firstyear of the war and left him badly damaged politically.[77]

As he gained experience, Lincoln took astronger hand in supervising matters in Missouri, but he neverfully comprehended the situation there. Particularly indicative ofthis failure was his well-meaning but futile proposal in 1865 toend the irregular violence in the state by appealing to the peopleto return home and agree to leave one another alone. Detailing theflaws in Lincoln's plan, the new governor privately indicated thathe had an "utter want of confidence in its success" and asked thepresident to withhold it. From St. Louis an astonished GeneralGrenville M. Dodge was more blunt: "Allow me to assure you that thecourse you propose would be protested against by the Stateauthorities, the legislature, the convention and by nearly everyundoubtedly loyal man in North Missouri," he telegraphed thepresident, "while it would receive the sanction of nearly everydisloyal, semi-loyal, and non-committed person there, all suchcould, under that course live and should want to stay in thatcountry, while every loyal man would have to leave thesecounties...."[78] Lincoln persisted in thisplan, with no good result.

The irregular nature of the loyal staegovernment in Missouri presented yet another handicap. In Maryland,the state government was controlled by the Unionists from thebeginning, and their supremacy was established beyond challenge bythe fall elections of 1861. Like Missouri, Kentucky had apro-Confederate governor when the war began, but even afterUnionists secured control of the legislature, they declined to ousthim. Instead, they tied his hands so he could not aid theConfederacy and eventually induced him to Page [End Page 42] resign. As a result, the stategovernment retained its legitimacy throughout the war, and in 1863an unequivocal Unionist was elected governor.

In Missouri, however, Lyon's belligerencecaused Governor Claiborne Jackson to ally openly with theConfideracy. Missouri Unionists in the state convention declaredthe governorship vacant, but rather than holding a popular electionto select Jackson's successor, the convention, with only tenuouslegal authority, selected Hamilton Gamble as governor. Initially,Gamble was to serve only until a regular election could be held,but the Unionist majority in the convention postponed the electionseveral times because of the unceasing disorder in the state, andGamble continued to hold the post until his death in 1864. As aconservative, Gamble confronted a severe challenge situation underthe best of circ*mstances, but his position was rendered infinitelymore difficult by the fact that he had never been elected by thevoters. Such an undemocratic procedure ran counter to the Americanpolitical tradition; his moral authority undermined, Gamble couldneither control the Union party in the state nor the civilianpopulation. Missouri had no constitutionally legitimate governmentuntil the last few months of the war.[79]

If Gamble's irregular election weakened theauthority of government in Missouri, the state's geographiclocation diminished the role of the U.S. Army, a potential prop forthe state government. The inability of the Confederacy to mount anysustained threat west of the Mississippi after the Battle of PeaRidge left the federal government anxious to devote as littlemilitary attention to the state as possible. A massive militaryoccupation of the state, such as occurred in Maryland in 1861, andto a lesser extent in Kentucky, was not feasible in Missouri.Instead, Lincoln constantly complained about the number of troopshe had to divert from more important objectives in order to controlthe state's civilian population. In refusing to disband the state'smilitia, which the state authorities created to preserve order,Lincoln explained, "I confess to a sympathy for whatever relievesour general force in Missouri, and allows it to serve elsewhere."[80]

Compounding these difficulties was thetradition of frontier violence in the state. Much more recentlysettled than Maryland or Kentucky, Missouri was much closer to thefrontier stage of settle- Page [End Page 43] ment, with its vigilante tradition and greatertolerance of personal violence. While also a problem in thepro-Confederate southern portion of the state, guerrilla warfarewas especially pronounced in the turbulent, brawling westerncounties along the Missouri River. These counties had been in theforefront of the struggle to make Kansas a slave state in the1850s. Relatively recently settled, they had become the majorslaveholding area of the state by the 1850s, a factor that inflamedpopular fears in the region. These fears, and the resultingbitterness stemming from the Kansas struggle, carried over into thewar years and intensified. With an irregular state government andan ineffective military presence, these emotions soon erupted intopersonal violence. Once started, the strategy of retaliation andcounterretaliation was impossible to stop. Moreover, it quicklyspread across the border into Kansas, provoking retaliatorymilitary raids from that state. Kansas troops invaded Missouri onseveral occasions and, remembering the long history of violence intheir state, routinely plundered the civilian population, therebyincreasing the animosity between the two states.[81]

Another difference that contributed to theLincoln administration's difficulties in Missouri compared to theother border states was the state's past political history. UnlikeMaryland and Kentucky, which had been Whig strongholds until theparty's collapse in the 1850s, Missouri had been a Democraticstate. Whiggery strengthened moderate Unionism in Maryland andKentucky. In Missouri, in contrast, bitter factionalism eruptedbetween former Whigs and Democrats in the Union ranks; thisfactionalism soon became more complicated, as the issue ofemancipation broke the Union ranks further into Radicals andconservatives.[82]

Aware that he needed the support andcooperation of all loyal Union men, Lincoln tried to steer a middlecourse. He told John Schofield when the latter assumed his new postas military commander in the state, "If both factions, or neither,shall abuse you, you will probably be about right."[83] Lincoln's moderation satisfied neither side.Confessing that he had been tormented with the state's factionalquarrels beyond endurance, he complained, "Neither side Page [End Page 44] pays the leastrespect to my appeals to your reason."[84] Oneconsequence of growing Radical strength was the abolition ofslavery in Missouri, but it also produced a particularly virulentparty factionalism that inflamed popular passions, crippled thestate Republican party, and strengthened their opponents. InMaryland, the Radicals, while important, never commanded thesupport they gained in Missouri. And in Kentucky, the larger numberof slaves, the stronger sentiment against emancipation, and theRadicals' failure to attract any prominent leader kept themimpotent.

A final reason that contributed to thedifferent experiences of these states was the existence of aRepublican party in Missouri before the war. This fact heightenedRepublican factionalism, drew the Lincoln administration intosquabbles for state power, and made it easier for a Radical factionto develop. In Maryland, and especially Kentucky, the party wasmore circ*mspect, being relatively weaker. As a result, the Lincolnadministration worked closely with Unionists of other parties,which helped promote greater consensus.

Clearly the problems Lincoln confronted inthese states were not all of his own making. Still, as president hemade some serious mistakes in his border state policy. PerhapsLincoln's biggest blunder was his early appointments in Missouri.Together, Blair, Lyon, and Frémont created a host of problemsand controversies that continued long after Lyon's death andFrémont's removal. Lincoln's inexperience was woefullyapparent. His handling of Kentucky, in contrast, was much moresuccessful, and he was greatly aided by capable Unionists such asJohn J. Crittenden, Garrett Davis, James Speed, Leslie Combs, JamesGuthrie, and Robert J. Breckinridge.

Lincoln's effectiveness in dealing withsubordinates is well illustrated in the cases of Generals RobertSchenck in Maryland and Samuel Curtis and John Schofield inMissouri. But being further removed from the scene and less certainof the situation, he gave Curtis and Schofield considerable leewayin policy matters, although he ultimately became frustrated thatneither heeded his admonition that it was not "in the province of amilitary commander to interfere with the local politics or toinfluence elections actively in one way or another."[85] In Maryland, Schenck used his power to underminethe institution of slavery and in the process sometimes ran athwartof presidential directives. Aware of the situation, Lincoln, who onone occasion observed that Schenck was "wider across the head in Page [End Page 45] the region ofthe ears," routinely summoned him to Washington, rewrote hisorders, gave him much more explicit instructions, and kept him on amuch tighter leash.[86]

Lincoln's problems in dealing with hisgenerals highlighted one of the major causes for his difficulties:the hostile attitude of army officers, especially those from theNorth, toward the residents of the border states. The politicalambitions of officers native to the state, such as StephenBurbridge in Kentucky, were a further complication. In all threestates, the army played a major role in destroying slavery,sometimes in accord with presidential policy or federal law, othertimes not. Viewing the people of the border states as at leastquasi-disloyal, Union generals erred on the side of overzealousnessin making arrests and confiscating private property. With a fewexceptions, the generals in command in Kentucky and Missouri lackedtact and common sense and often acted in an arbitrary andhighhanded manner. Kentucky's early neutrality and persistentopposition to emancipation particularly discredited the state withthe military. Governor Bramlette put his finger on the centralproblem in this regard when he bitterly complained: "We are dealtwith as though Kentucky was a rebellious and conquered province,instead of being as they [sic] are, a brave and loyal people."[87]

Lincoln's record in dealing with the borderstates contained both successes and failures. Certainly keepingthese states in the Union was Lincoln's greatest achievement duringthe first year of his presidency. Yet on otherissues—emancipation, arbitrary arrests, the preservation ofpublic order, and relations between civil and militaryauthorities—his policies provoked greater resistance. He wasespecially plagued by the intractable situation in Missouri. To amuch greater extent than either Maryland or Kentucky, that stateproved impervious to Lincoln's presidential leadership. It left adark blot on his otherwise generally positive record ofaccomplishments in the border states. Page [End Page 46]

I wish to thank Mark E. Neely,Jr., who commented on an earlier version of this article, for anumber of helpful suggestions.